Analysis of the evolution of the appraisal and oppression remedy and its adoption under the Companies Act in South Africa. by Essop, Suhaifa.
   
 
SUHAIFA ESSOP 
 
210 531 640 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE APPRAISAL AND OPPRESSION REMEDY 
AND ITS ADOPTION UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
 
A mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS LAW 
 
In the Graduate School of Law 
Supervisor: Darren Subramanien
  ii 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I, Suhaifa Essop, hereby declare that the work contained herein is entirely my own, except where 
indicated in the text itself, and that this work has not been submitted in full or partial fulfilment 
of the academic requirements of any other degree or qualification at any other University. 
 
I further declare that this dissertation reflects the law as at the date of signature hereof. 
 
This project is an original piece of work which is made available for photocopying and for inter-
library loan. 
 
Signed and dated at Pietermaritzburg on the                               day of November 2018. 
 
 
  iii 
    
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am grateful to the Almighty God for making this journey possible. To my parents and loving 
husband to whom I am truly thankful to for all the support and words of encouragement during 
this time. I would like to thank my dear friend Nikolai for the support he has given me 
throughout this journey. To my supervisor Advocate Subramanien, thank you for your guidance, 
patience and direction. You have all made this it possible for this degree to be completed, and I 
am eternally grateful.
  iv 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 encapsulates the economic sphere, its procedures, problems and 
possible resolutions to such issues on a wide scale. It allows a litigant a basis and a guideline 
when dealing with corporate law in relation to the corporate sector. The main idea is to allow 
free, fair and prosperous trade not only for the majority shareholders but also for the minorities 
and the financial environment as a whole. Every shareholder who has invested in a company 
needs to be given the opportunity to be a part of a concern in which (s)he has full confidence and 
reliance on the controlling members. The issue arises when the aforementioned is not complied 
with whether it is a large corporation or a small start-up business. There are several remedies 
which can be used as a means of restitution, however, for purposes of this dissertation we shall 
analyse two controversial and expanded remedies, namely the Appraisal and Oppression 
remedies. This dissertation focuses on the two by analyzing the introduction of the Appraisal 
remedyand its source of adoption and the development of the Oppression remedy with the main 
aim of answering the questions of whether, firstly, these remedies are warranted in South Africa 
and, secondly, whether or not further expansion is required for their proper functioning. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
It was stated by Samuel Adams that 
It does not require a majority to prevail but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set fires in peoples 
mind.
1
 
People venture into business with the goal of acquiring profit to acquire a better quality of life. It 
allows them to be a part of a greater purpose and influence the business sector they intend 
entering. All companies are uniquely designed and structured to suit the needs and wants of the 
different shareholders, dependent on their respective buy-in capabilities and financial 
contribution(s).
2
 
Once the purchase of shares is concluded, each shareholder is broadly divided into two 
categories; namely, the Majority and Minority shareholder(s). This then creates a power struggle 
between them, either on an individual or a collective level when dealing with the running of the 
company and the principles and policy decisions that are incorporated to do so.  
Companies are being incorporated on a daily basis and the desire for the furtherance of one‘s 
own needs can make a person who has ultimate power, in this case the majority shareholder(s), 
to make decisions that adversely affect the minority. This gain comes at a heavy cost as 
shareholders lose faith not only in the company, but the law itself.  
The New Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ―the New Act‖) sought to 
redress the problems that have plagued the corporate sector when dealing with the relief that can 
be sought by aggrieved minority shareholders. It sets out several actions that can be taken against 
the oppressive, unfair or prejudicial conduct or omission by the majority.  
The aim of this research was to set out the remedies and go into detail when dealing with two 
very important remedies that have an adverse effect on not only the member(s) but also the 
company and the economic sector as a whole.  
                                                          
1
 Quote by Samel Adams available at https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/31693.Samuel_Adams , accessed 
on 23 October 2018.  
2
 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 3-8. 
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The need for such protection arises from the fact that South Africa is an emerging third-world 
country that has foreign investors and shareholders, whether it is by a majority or the minority        
shareholding. Thus, the protection of the minority and the control of the majority‘s action are 
very important for continuous, stable and progressive economic growth. 
This dissertation gives a brief history of the Companies Act in South Africa and how it was 
incorporated by looking briefly at English law and the Oppression remedy as well as critically 
analysing two remedial actions that are available to a minority shareholder; namely, the 
Appraisal remedy found in the New Act
3
  section 164 and the Oppression remedy under section 
163 and comparing the changes and amendments made from its predecessor acts; namely 
Companies Act
4
 (hereinafter referred to as ―the Old Act‖) s252 and its earliest foundation in 
section 111bis the Companies Act
5
 (hereinafter referred to as the ― the 1926 Act‖). 
The rationale behind this study was to give an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the 
Companies Act with regards to the protection that it affords the minority shareholder. It will 
endeavor to clearly outline two remedies available and the problems that are associated with 
them. The research briefly touches on the position in English law and Canadian law to discern if 
the Oppression remedy that was copied from the English law is warranted in South Africa. 
The conclusion of this study sought to provide a brief outline of any problems that the remedies 
still encounter as stated by academic writers and whether or not there is a need for legislature to 
step in and develop the law further and/or give clarity to these problems.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
4
 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
5
 Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
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1.1. Brief background of the past and future protection under the Appraisal and 
Oppression remedy 
The current position in South African company law can be seen as a step in the right direction as 
it provides minority shareholders a number of remedies that can be found in the New Act.
6
 The 
two remedies that this research explores are the Appraisal
7
 and the Oppression
8
 remedies.  
The Appraisal right has been introduced for the first time under the New Act.
9
 It affords a 
minority shareholder to offer the majority an opportunity to buy out his/her shares when (s)he 
does not agree to a resolution that is to be passed if (s)he feels that the passing of the resolution 
will adversely affect his/her rights or interests in the company.
10
 
Once the resolution has been passed, it must be communicated, within ten days, after it was 
taken to all shareholders, including those who objected to the resolution, and within that time 
frame, have neither withdrawn the notice nor voted in favour of the resolution.
11
 
Thereafter, the minority shareholder may exercise this right by demanding the company to 
purchase his/her shares within twenty days of receiving communication of the resolution being 
passed
12
 or if this was not communicated, within twenty days of becoming aware of the 
resolution.
13
 
As can be deduced from above, company law not only regulates the formation of a company but 
caters for the situation of dissatisfaction in various ways.
14
 It allows for the restitution of those 
aggrieved individuals or collectives who have been metaphorically ‗shut out‘ of crucial or 
mundane decision making by the majority vote.
15
 
The research looks at the evolution of the remedies and the way courts have interpreted it and 
briefly touches on the intention of legislature when drafting the New Act. It will further evaluate 
                                                          
6
 Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
7
 Section 164 of Act 71 of 2008.  
8
 Section 163 of Act 71 of 2008. 
9
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
10
 Sections 164 (1)-(3) of Act 71 of 2008. 
11
 Section 164(4) of Act 71 of 2008.  
12
 Section 164(5) of Act 71of 2008.  
13
 Section 164(7) of Act 71 of 2008.  
14
 FHI Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 8.   
15
 Ibid at 796.  
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how academic writers and courts have interpreted the requirements of the section dealing with 
the Oppression remedy
16
 and the Appraisal remedy when defining fair market value.
17
 This will 
lead to the conclusion which seeks to address the question of what aspects of the two sections 
need further development and/or clarification by legislature. 
The starting point for determining protection of minority shareholders would be to critically 
analyse the rules set out by the New Act and the Memorandum of Incorporation (MoI) of the 
company which will provide details as to the class of shares and preferences, the rights and 
limitations and other terms associated with the class of shares or, in the event that a company has 
a shareholder‘s agreement, the shareholder agreement.18 
The 1926 Act required there to be a breakdown of the relationship between the parties, as this 
was seen as a good cause for winding up the business however, winding up was the only remedy 
available to the shareholders. Other factors that were taken into consideration were the merits of 
the matter, law justice and equity.
19
 This was problematic when it came to public companies as 
opposed to private companies who had a strong relationship that was easily determinable and so 
was the breakdown. The 1926 Act was later repealed and the Oppression remedy had seen 
substantial development.
20
 
The position under the Old Act was rather onerous on the minority shareholder, and in order to 
elicit any relief the Act of 1973 stated the following: 
‗Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or omission of a company is 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted 
in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to some part of the members of 
the company, may, make an application to court for an order under this section‘.
21
 
Apart from the court not willing to grant these orders readily, this section was onerous and 
limited due to the wording, as the minority shareholder bore the onus of proof to be able to attain 
                                                          
16
 Section (1) (a)-(c) of Act 71of 2008.  
17
 Section 164(5) of Act 71of 2008.  
18
 FHI Cassim et al op cit note 2.  
19
 A Sibanda ‗Advancing the statutory remedy for unfair prejudice in South African company law: Perspectives 
from international jurisprudence‘(2015) 27(3) SA Mercantile Law Journal 405. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Section 252(1) of Act 61 of 1973.  
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satisfaction from the court to prove that the conduct was unfair or prejudicial to him by the 
majority as the minority.
22
 
In the Garden Province Investment and Others v Aleph (Pty) Ltd and Others (Garden 
Province)
23
, the court further held that apart from proving the conduct and the effect of the 
conduct, s252 of the Old Act required the applicant be a member of the company at the time of 
the alleged conduct. This had caused problems for applicants who were not members at the time 
but who were aware of unfair practices by the majority pending his/her appointment.  
The Oppression Remedy under s163 of the New Act is broader and allows the court to make any 
order in terms of s163(2)(a) -(i) which will be explained fully in the dissertation. The 
requirements for relief under this section have now developed drastically as it now allows an 
applicant to seek court assistance even if the conduct is not only unfair and/or prejudicial to the 
minority shareholders but, now includes the applicant solely. This leads to the next remedial 
process that a minority shareholder can procure. 
The Appraisal remedy under s164 of the New Act allows a minority shareholder to avoid further 
prejudice by affording the majority an opportunity to ‗buy him out‘ purchasing his shares for a 
fair market value. There has been debate as to the determination of fair market price which will 
be addressed further in the dissertation. 
The New Act sought to address the need for broader more effective protection for the minority, 
notwithstanding the need for discretion and certainty. Therefore, several remedies which can be 
used against oppressive majority rule behavior have been put into place by the legislature.  
The exercise of the Appraisal right requires the company to make offers, of a fair market value, 
to all shareholders who objected to the passing of the resolution, and these offers should last for a 
period of 30 days.  Failing acceptance, within the time frame, the offer lapses.
24
 
In a policy paper that was published by the Department of Trade and Industry the main emphasis 
of the New Act was echoed. The paper titled South African Company Law for the 21st Century: 
                                                          
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Garden Province Investment & others v Aleph (Pty) Ltd & others 1979 (2) SA 525 (d) 531. 
24
 Section 164(11) of Act 71 of 2008. 
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Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform
25
 stated that the main aim was to afford the minority 
shareholder the exercise of their basic right and the ability to exit a company, after making an 
informed decision, by allowing the majority the opportunity to buy his shares when he/she is 
unable to influence the decisions of the majority.
26
 
The Appraisal remedy is considered by some as a means of softening the provisions in company 
legislation which allow majority shareholders, or a group of connected shareholders, to effect 
fundamental changes
27
 however, these changes will come at the fair price of buying out the 
minority for a fair market value. 
The above illustrates a fair and fundamental change brought about by the New Act and even 
though the intention of protection is heavily emphasized upon, this draws towards the research 
question as to how a fair market value is determined and how courts have interpreted this when 
dealing with cases. 
The Oppression remedy in the New Act has seen much development since its predecessory 
Act.
28
 The remedy is now broader as it allows minority shareholders seeking relief to apply to 
the court for an appropriate order by placing a less onerous requirement on the applicant. 
In terms of the New Act, a shareholder or director may apply to the court if any act or omission 
of the company or any related person has had a result that is: 
1) oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interest of the 
applicant;  
2) or the business is being conducted in a manner that is oppressive or prejudicial to the 
applicant;  
3) or the powers of a director or prescribed officer is being exercised in a manner that is 
oppressive or prejudicial to the applicant.
29
 
                                                          
25
 South African company law for the 21st century guidelines for corporate law reform in GN 1183 GG 2649 3 of 23 
June 2004.   
26
 Ibid. 
27
 B Manning ‗The shareholder‘s appraisal remedy: An essay for Frank Coker‘ (1962) 72(22) Yale Law Journal 226. 
28
 Section 252 of Act 61 of 973.  
29
 Section 163 (a)- (c) of Act 71 of 2008.   
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As a comparison to the Old Act, there is a less onerous requirement for the applicant to prove to 
the court to find redress under this section. The applicant only has to prove that the conduct is 
prejudicial to him/her and his/her interests and not that the conduct or omission brought about by 
the majority is directed at him as a minority.
30
 
The New Act‘s development now offers a wide-range of relief in the event of oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial conduct in two ways. It makes provisions for not just a shareholder but also 
for a director to complain and access the remedy in respect of oppressive conduct
31
 and allows a 
court to make a wide range of orders that it deems appropriate in the circumstance, which is a far 
more extensive list
32
 than those found in s252 of the Old Act.
33
  
The above brings us to the research question of how courts have interpreted the requirements and 
its application when dealing with a specific set of facts and whether its inclusion is warranted in 
South African law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 Section 252(1) of Act 61 of 1973.   
31
 Section 164 (2) of Act 71 of 2008.  
32
 Sections 163(2) (a)- (l) of Act 71 of 2008. 
33
 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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CHAPTER 2: OPPRESSION REMEDY 
The writer submits that one might argue when a shareholder buys or invests in the title of being a 
minority shareholder, that she expressly and/or tacitly binds themselves to the idea that (s)he will 
have minimal input and/or influence when it comes to decision making process. Thus, (s)he shall 
be a so-called ‗silent investor‘ in the eyes of the majority, due to their inability and lack of voting 
capacity to challenge a majority resolution.  
The above is not as far-fetched as it seems. The objective of the New Companies Act
34
 was to 
counter the above idea and make the economic environment accessible to all companies 
regardless of size and to ensure that they are adaptive, innovative and internationally 
competitive.
35
 
Company law is premised on the grounds that those who have controlling powers in a company 
need to carry on business and conduct its affairs in a manner that is not prejudicial or unfair to 
those shareholders or members that lack such capacity.
36
 
It should be noted at the forefront that when the majority makes a decision and it is done in 
accordance with the law
37
 it is not challengeable and the shareholders cannot unilaterally 
withdraw solely on the basis that their personal expectations are not met.
38
 This, in essence, 
means that the majority needs to act bona fide and in a manner that has the outcome of 
benefitting the company as a whole.
39
 
2.1. The Need for Reform 
South African Company law has existed since 1861, dating back to a predecessor piece of 
legislation, the Joint Stock Companies Limited Liabilities Act no 23 of 1861 of the Cape Colony, 
which was equivalent to English law.
40
 Since then, the Companies Act in South Africa has seen 
development and reform as well as individuality, thus distancing itself from English law by 
                                                          
34
 Act 71 of 2008. 
35
 South African company law for the 21st century guidelines for corporate law reform op cit note 25 at 8.  
36
 Aspek Pipe Co (Pty) Ltd v Mauerberger 1968 (1) SA 517 (c) at 525.  
37
 Ben- Tovim v Ben-Tovin 2001 (3) SA 1074 (ac) at 1092; see Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd & others v Anglo-
Transvaal Colliers Ltd & others 1980 (4) SA 204 (T) at 209. 
38
 Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers (Pty) Ltd 2008 (3) SA 663 (c) at 526.  
39
 Gunderfinger v African Textile Manufacturers Ltd 1939 AD 314 at 324-325. 
40
 South African company law for the 21st century guidelines for corporate law reform op cit note 35.  
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finding its own, more appropriate, direction. Using English law as a guide instead of a 
precedent.
41
 
The largest departure from English law can be seen by the enactment of the Close Corporation 
Act, No 69 of 1984.
42
 This was an English Policy paper that was never used in the UK but was 
adopted in South Africa, which shows not only development in our law but further illustrates the 
economic differences between the two countries.
43
 The aim of the Close Corporation Act
44
 was 
to assist smaller businesses by means of an affordable yet effective alternative to ensure 
economic growth for our country by encouraging and equipping entrepreneurs with an 
inexpensive legal framework.
45
 
Individuality and appropriateness are vital and crucial based on South Africa‘s economic, social 
and political differences when it comes to legislating in a country. 
2.2. The Aim and Purpose of Legislature 
Drafters of the New Company Act
46
 encountered, as stated above, the task of balancing the 
encouragement of foreign investment while offering shareholders every possible form of 
protection should their rights be infringed.
47
 
Shareholder remedies can be found in Chapter 7 of the New Companies Act,
48
 however, for 
purposes of this dissertation two remedial actions were analyzed; The Appraisal and Oppression 
remedies. 
The Appraisal and Oppression remedies are two remedial actions that can be found under 
sections 164 and 163 of the New Companies Act.
49
 These are the most used remedies by 
minority shareholders and authors have stated that the reason for this is that it finds application 
by smaller private companies whereby shareholders play a more active role in the running of the 
                                                          
41
 South African company law for the 21st century guidelines for corporate law reform op cit note 25 at 12.   
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984. 
45
 South African company law for the 21st century guidelines for corporate law reform op cit note 41.  
46
 Act 71 of 2008. 
47
  J Yeats ‗Putting appraisal rights into perspective‘ 2014 Stell LR 331. 
48
 Act 71 of 2008. 
49
 Ibid. 
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company.
50
 This shall therefore be discussed in detail and analysed to answer the research 
question as to whether such protection is sufficient and warranted in South Africa. 
We start looking at the Oppression remedy, as this can also be found in the Old Act
51
 and has 
seen much development under the New Act
52
 due to its previous stringent requirements and 
narrow application.  
The existence of minority shareholders gives rise to the remedies in company law at their 
disposal. As stated above, the purpose of these remedies is to protect and enforce their rights as 
shareholders and as being part of a decision-making process, which can be undermined by a 
majority.
53
 This protection is afforded if they have reasonable grounds to believe that their 
interests have been violated or oppressed by the directors or by the majority shareholders.
54
 
The reason behind the abuse of minority shareholders can be found in the Majority Rule 
principle in the governance of companies.
55
 This is what company law in South Africa seeks to 
address. It seeks to provide a statutory medium for court intervention and a solution to the non-
judicial intervention principle in corporate management, thus causing the majority rule principle 
to be subject to judicial intervention.
56
 However, it should be noted that courts will not likely 
interfere with managerial operations of a company - instead, electing to allow the controlling 
members to operate with minimal unwarranted minority interference.
57
 
Courts have followed the view that the conduct the applicant complains of needs to be weighed 
up against the majority rule principle to ascertain whether or not the conduct falls within the 
definition of unfairly prejudicial, inequitable or unjust.
58
 
 
 
                                                          
50
 FHI Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 758.  
51
 Section 252 of Act 61 of 1973.  
52
 Act 71 of 2008. 
53
 A Sibanda op cit note 19 at 401.   
54
 Ibid. 
55
 A Sibanda op cit note 53. 
56
 Ibid 
57
 MJ Oosthuisen ‗Statutere minderheidsbeskerming in die maatskappyereg‘ 1981 Journal of South African Law 
105. 
58
 Aspek supra note 36 at 529. 
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2.3. Oppression Remedy 
2.3.1. Overview of the Oppression Remedy Under the 1926 Act and the Old Companies Act 
 
The need for protection of shareholders has always been a concern and the efforts to address this 
in South African law dates back to 1926.
59
 This was when s111bis of the 1926 Act
60
 was enacted 
and was adopted from English law; namely, s210 of the English Companies Act of 1948.
61
 The 
Oppression remedy is also prevalent in other jurisdictions with the main focus on protecting the 
minority and aggrieved shareholders who have little to no recourse.
62
 
Prior to the Oppression remedy, aggrieved parties used s117 of the 1926 Act,
63
 however, the use 
of this section meant that the company would be under compulsory winding-up if the applicant 
was successful. This did not only have repercussions for the majority but for the minority as 
well.
64
 
This form of remedial action was also found under s111bis and its application can be found in 
the Moosa NO v Mavjee Bhawan (Moosa)
65
 case whereby the court stated: 
‗An irreparable breakdown of a personal relationship between shareholders was noted as providing a good cause for 
winding-up of a company. The granting of a winding-up order under s111bis involved not only a consideration of 
the merits of the matter but a broad conclusion of the law, justice and equity.‘66 
From the above we can see that not only were the requirements onerous in that it required the 
applicant to prove ‗oppressive conduct‘ and to prove that this conduct justified the winding-up of 
the company but it also gave the applicant, if successful, very limited recourse as the courts were 
restricted to winding-up of the company. 
                                                          
59
 A Sibanda op cit note 53.   
60
 Section 111bis of Act 46 of 1926. 
61
 A Sibanda op cit note 19 at 403. 
62
 Section 994 of the English Companies Act 2006 and section 241 of the Canadian Business Corporation Act R.S.C. 
1985. c.C – 44 . 
63
 Act 46 of 1926. 
64
 Elder v Elder & Watson Ltd 1952 SC 49 at 54 per L Cooper.  
65
 Moosa NO v Mavjee Bhawa [1967] (3) SA 131 (T). 
66
 Moosa supra note 65 at 136H-I. 
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The Companies Act of 1926
67
 required there to be a breakdown of the relationship between the 
parties as this was seen as a good cause for winding up the business. However, winding-up was 
the only remedy available to the shareholders.
68
 Other factors that were taken into consideration 
were the merits of the matter, law justice and equity.
69
 This was problematic when it came to 
public companies as opposed to private companies who had a strong relationship that was easily 
determinable and so was the breakdown. The 1926 Act was later repealed and the Oppression 
remedy had seen substantial development.
70
 
The conduct that courts were inclined to approve of as being oppressive had to follow the 
specific requirement of being either ‗unjust, harsh or tyrannical‘.71 
The above section was repealed and now found its application under S252 of the Old Act of 
1973. The reason for this was, as stated above, its restrictive nature in application and 
interpretation from its foundation found in the English Companies Act.
72
  
The Old Act
73
 had broadened the scope of conduct that can be challenged by a disgruntled 
shareholder, however, s252 was still restrictive. The position under the Old Act still placed a 
heavy burden on the minority shareholder to elicit any relief. The 1973 Act stated the following: 
‗Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or omission of a company is unfairly prejudicial, 
unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust 
or inequitable to him or to some part of the members of the company, may, make an application to court for an order 
under this section.‘
74
 
In Garden Province Friedman J. points out that the minority shareholder seeking redress under 
s252(1) needed to establish, not only that the act or omission was unfairly prejudicial on him but, 
                                                          
67
 Act 46 of 1926. 
68
 A Sibanda op cit note 19 at 405.  
69
 Ibid. 
70
 A Sibanda op cit note 68. 
71
 Aspek supra note 36 at 526; see also Marshall v Marshall (Pty) Ltd & others 1954 (3) SA 571 (N) at 580. 
72
 A Sibanda op cit note 19 at 404.  
73
 Act 61 of 1973. 
74
 Section 252(1) of Act 61 of 1973. 
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further, that it was inequitable.
75
 This, however, is a less onerous requirement than proving that 
the conduct complained of by the applicant was ‗oppressive‘ as required by the 1926 Act.76 
Apart from the court not willing to grant orders readily, this section was rather onerous and 
limited due to the wording. For the minority shareholder to be able to attain satisfaction from the 
court, they would bear the onus of proof to prove that the conduct was ‗unfair or prejudicial‘ to 
them by the majority as the minority.
77
 The main issue with this section was its limited 
applicability, as it could only be used by applicants who were ‗members‘ at the time of the 
alleged misconduct.
78
 The New Act replaced the word ‗member‘ with ‗shareholder‘ as defined in 
s1 of the New Act, however, the terms can be used interchangeably and still have the same 
meaning.
79
 
The major shortcoming in the Old Act was the requirement of locus standi. The Old Act required 
that, at the time of the alleged misconduct the applicant had to have been a member, as defined 
by section 103 of the Old Act. This was attained by being registered and appearing on the 
members register.
80
 
The above, in terms of court acceptance, was applicable unless the non-member found difficulty 
in attaining such registration due to frustration by the existing members and thus, could apply 
under s252 despite this.
81
 
Despite the above, a person who has an interest in a share, whether in a personal or 
representative capacity, will not be able to bring an application under s252 due to lack of locus 
standi.
82
 
The Old Act, despite its flaws, allowed for further application in certain instances, however, as 
can be seen, it did not fulfil the true nature of the Oppression remedy and its intended purpose. In 
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Bayly v Knowles (Bayly)
83
, the court pointed out a very significant diversional approach the 
courts took, under s252, as opposed to liquidation by stating: 
‗...the way the court can achieve the objects of s252 without taking the drastic step of liquidation is to 
order that the majority shareholders purchase the shares of the minority shareholder or for the minority 
shareholder to purchase the shares of the majority...
84
 
S252
85
 eliminated the burden placed on the minority shareholder to prove that the conduct 
complained of justified the winding-up of a company, it also allowed a court to make an order if 
it was satisfied that the conduct complained of warranted the granting of the relief under the 
provision with the view of bringing it to an end.
86
The courts under s252 would only intervene if 
it was just and equitable to do so, which is illustrated in Donaldson Investments(Pty) Ltd & 
others v Anglo-Transvaal Colliers Ltd and others 
87
 whereby the court stated: 
‗…this is perfectly logical; for instance, an act which is unjustly prejudicial may be subsequently rectified or 
balanced by subsequent conduct or else it may fall within the provision of the de minimus principle. Accordingly, an 
applicant must not only establish that the conduct is unjustly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, but also that it is just 
and equitable that the court should come to his relief…‘88 
The court could also impose an order that it deems ‗fit‘.89 The definition of fit, as defined by the 
courts, was taken to be wide and with the purpose of bringing an end to the conduct complained 
of and have a consequence on the oppressor.
90
 
2.3.2. Oppression Remedy Developed Under the Company Act 71 of 2008 
The amendment of the Companies Act has seen many changes from s252 of the Old Act
91
 which 
can now be found under s163 of the New Act.
92
 
The s163 now reads as follows: 
                                                          
83
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84
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‗(1) A shareholder or a director of a company may apply to a court for relief if: 
(a) Any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; 
(b) The business of the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried on or 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards 
the interests of, the applicant; or 
(c) The powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person related to the 
company, are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant.‘93 
Before looking at the new requirements critically, it is important to note the wide array of 
remedies under this section for a successful applicant to see what the courts can now do under 
the New Act. Under s163 (2)
94
 it provides the court the ability to make various orders that it 
deems fit in the circumstance to rectify the oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct that the 
applicant has complained of. These remedies are more extensive than the ones that were 
provided for in s252 of the Old Act and include the following interim and final orders: 
‘(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of; 
(b) an order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be insolvent; 
(c) an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings 
in terms of Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that the circumstances set out in section 131(4)(a) 
apply; 
(d) an order to regulate the company‘s affairs by directing the company to amend its 
Memorandum of Incorporation or to create or amend a unanimous shareholder agreement; 
(e) an order directing an issue or exchange of shares; 
(f) an order— 
(i) appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in 
office; or 
                                                          
93
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(ii) declaring any person delinquent or under probation, as contemplated in section 162; 
(g) an order directing the company or any other person to restore to a shareholder any part of the 
consideration that the shareholder paid for shares, or pay the equivalent value, with or without 
conditions; 
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or an agreement to which the company is a 
party and compensating the company or any other party to the transaction or agreement; 
(i) an order requiring the company, within a time specified by the court, to produce to the court or 
an interested person financial statements in a form required by this Act, or an accounting in any 
other form the court may determine; 
(j) an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject to any other law entitling that 
person to compensation; 
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a company; or 
(l) an order for the trial of any issue as determined by the court.‘95 
From the above we can see the type of remedies are extremely comprehensive and involve 
minimal judicial intervention but also, they allow the court to make any decision that the court 
deems appropriate if the relief is not found under this section.
96
 This allows the court to decide 
each case on a case-by-case basis and, as is known, legislature does not always provide for every 
case or situation that the court may face, thus granting the court the opportunity and discretion 
that it requires to make a fair and just order.
97
 
The order(s) which a court can/will grant is discussed later on in this chapter. However, for a 
court to grant any order it deems fit, the applicant will first have to satisfy the requirements that 
are set out s163 (1).
98
 
In Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd (Count Gotthard) 
99
 case, the 
court in summary emphasised the need for all the requirements under the section to be fulfilled 
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for the applicant, including the requirement that the applicant needed to be a shareholder or a 
director, to find success when applying to the court.
100
 
The amendments that are brought about by the New Act have also seen some critical review by 
academic writers. One article which was helpful in assisting in the amendments and the problems 
associated with the requirements was the critical analysis of the Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd (Peel).
101
 This case was the second case that dealt with the Oppression remedy and the 
court was faced with a complex set of facts and needed to answer questions regarding the 
application of s163 and the requirements that needed to be satisfied to be successful under this 
section.
102
 
To understand the reasoning behind the problems noted by the authors, we looked at the 
amendments that the New Act incorporated. There are many distinctions between the Old Act 
and the New. These distinctions relate to the requirements that need to be met in order for an 
applicant to be successful. 
2.3.2.1 Applicants Who Can Apply Under s163 
The first distinction is the extension of locus standi. The amendment to the wording of the New 
Act allows for broader application. The term ‗member‘ which was found in the Old Act was the 
reason for limited application.
103
 This is now replaced with the word ‗shareholder‘ and is 
applicable to not only shareholders of the company but also directors of the company.
104
 Despite 
the fact that the requirements for locus standi have broadened, it is still restrictive in the sense 
that the applicant still is required to be a registered shareholder. Thus, a party who has simply an 
interest will not have the required locus standi to be an applicant under s163.
105
 This can be seen 
as a means of Oppression on individuals who are not registered members but have an interest 
through a will or in the capacity of an executor or trustee.
106
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The above extension was overdue in South African law, taking into consideration that other 
jurisdictions have incorporated it into their scope. Such as England, which South Africa has 
followed because there are many similarities between s994 of the English Companies Act and 
s252 of the Old Act and s163 of the New Act.
107
 
The main argument Sibanda makes for the extension is that many directors, in majority of the 
cases in South Africa, found themselves having no recourse against oppressive conduct under the 
Old Act,
108
 which only catered for minority shareholders and were forced to leave their positions 
making the Oppression remedy not very effective in assisting the disgruntled shareholders.
109
 
Cassim also points out that a de facto
110
director will now be able to utilise this remedy. 
The New Act further allows an applicant to bring a single application whereas the Old Act 
required there be more than one applicant.
111
 
The writer is in agreement with the above submissions as minority shareholder(s) do not always 
find themselves in dispute with the majority. There are instances whereby the shareholder 
forming part of the majority does not agree or fails to vote in favour of a resolution thus making 
them their own minority. This was not thought of when legislature was drafting the 1926 Act
112
 
or the Old Act.
113
 The inclusion of ‗any shareholder‘ and the removal of the requirement that the 
conduct must be done to them as a minority is a step in the right direction. It not only broadens 
the scope but takes away the stigma that only minority shareholders are faced with problems in a 
company. 
Authors such as Cassim
114
 expand the scope of applicant further and imply that even if the 
applicant is not a shareholder or director at the time of the alleged misconduct, but become so 
after, they may still apply to court for relief under this section. 
Beukes and Swart
115
 highlight and make a valid point on limiting the interpretation of locus 
standi to apply to current directors and shareholders at the time of the misconduct. Their 
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reasoning behind it is the unfortunate event of allowing each and every individual shareholder 
(or not) to apply to court under this section and thus opening the ‗flood gates‘ and burdening 
courts with unfounded claims.
116
 They are of the opinion that legislature extended locus standi to 
shareholders and directors and/or affected parties are correct but further expansion is not their 
intention.
117
 
In Lourenco and Others v Ferela (Pty) Ltd (Lourenco),
118
 the applicants were denied locus 
standi, even though they were owners of the shares by means of a will, because they had not yet 
become members of the company.
119
 This can be seen as a huge disadvantage to people who are 
aware of unfair and prejudicial conduct occurring prior to their appointment as members. The 
writer submits that this is correct as individuals who have still not joined the company may be 
unaware of the company‘s reasons and rationale when the decision was made which can create 
unfounded claims on insufficient facts. The purpose of legislature was to allow a shareholder 
recourse which, in essence, means that they were a part of the decision-making process and at the 
time they were fully aware factually of the reasons and motives of such a decision. 
Authors such as Sibanda are of the view that the above is incorrect and that current shareholders 
may commit acts that are to the detriment of pre-registered shareholders.
120
 He also points out 
that the process of obtaining a shareholders‘ certificate is long and tedious and thus, future 
shareholders should be afforded protection under this section and, if not, the purpose and aim of 
the New Act
121
 are not fulfilled.
122
 This can be seen in private companies whereby the majority 
may frustrate and cause internal frustration by disallowing the registration of shares. 
Cassim
123
 points out an important analysis that the court may deviate from the requirement 
should the court be shown that the shareholders would have been registered had it not been for 
the frustration caused by the current shareholders or controlling powers. It is noteworthy that the 
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New Act allows judicial discretion for these types of situations and to avoid a block-out due to 
the non-shareholders facing the element of exclusion under the Act, even though not due to their 
doing. 
Another great development that the extension of standing brought about is the ability for ‗related 
persons‘ to apply.124 This extends not only to the shareholders of the affected company but also 
to ‗subsidiary company‘.125 
Beukes and Swart disagree with the above and point out on this aspect that the remedy itself 
needs to be protected from misuse and ‗as a means of Oppression‘.126 
The question of whether or not locus standi extends to non-members or future shareholders is 
still unanswered and unclear
127
 and is open to interpretation and legislative guidance. 
2.3.2.2. Conduct – Analysis of Domestic and International Legislature  
The next change that was brought about was the relaxation of what shareholders had to prove. 
Cassim
128
 has defined conduct as including ‗acts, omissions, the conducting of business or the 
exercise of power.‘ 
The ‗oppressive conduct‘ has now been broadened to also include ‗unfairly disregards‘ his or her 
interest.
129
 Sibanda points out that ‗the inclusion of a member‘s interest in the provision enables 
the remedy to now address instances involving an infringement of enumerated rights of 
shareholders.‘130 He goes on further to state that now rights also include ‗legitimate expectations‘ 
and that English case law has confirmed this.
131
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Canadian exercise of the Oppression remedy is broader in all senses. It allows shareholders who 
are not only disgruntled by an act or omission but includes the event of their expectations not 
being met.
132
  
In regards to Canadian Corporations, Ben-Ishai is of the opinion that the Oppression remedy has 
great potential when dealing with unequal power relations in both private and publicly-traded 
companies, provided that the litigants and judiciary extend their knowledge when dealing with 
such cases.
133
 Under Canadian law, the controlling members are given extensive power which 
allows them to realise the best interest of the company. 
Ben-Ishai claims that, if the protection of shareholders is not matched with equivalent remedial 
action, this may create the opportunity for purposeful exploitation by the corporation of 
shareholders and thus, could create the eventuality of disregarding the interests of non-
shareholders altogether.
134
 
There is much appeal in restricting the Oppression remedy to minority shareholders of private 
companies rather than expanding it further to encompass both private and public and non-
shareholders, due to procedural issues. However, its expansion will give broader application and 
reflect the intention of the Oppression remedy and allow protection of interests to all 
shareholders.
135
 
Ben-Ishai gives an explanation as to why, generally, there is an inapplicability of the Oppression 
remedy to public companies by highlighting the power disparity between the board of directors 
and shareholders. The power that the board of directors‘ holds is equivalent to that of a majority 
whom have little shareholder intervention whereas, in a private company, the board is often 
answerable to or dependent on the shareholders. Thus, majority shareholders may be able to 
make decisions that the board has to follow, which may adversely affect the minority.
136
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The main argument against reasonable expectations is its inability to provide a concrete method 
of application and form an objective basis. It can be used as a means of understanding a problem 
or a conflict. It is an open-ended concept that cannot be restricted to allow application in law.
137
 
Conduct as defined in the New Act
138
 is broader and allows for further application. In terms of 
the New Act, the ‗act or omission must be oppressive, unfairly prejudicial and/or unfairly 
disregard the interests of the applicant‘.139 
This shows development compared to the Old Act which stated that for the applicant to find 
success, (s)he needed to prove that the conduct was unfairly prejudicial to them as a minority, 
which placed less focus on the conduct and the effect but gave an eventuality which needed to be 
fulfilled, thus narrowing its application.
140
  
The above is confirmed in Louw v Nel (Louw) 
141
  whereby the court stated that under s252 of the 
Old Act an applicant needed to prove that the act or omission was committed or the affairs of 
business was done in a way that had the effect of being unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable 
to him or some part of the members of the company.
142
 
The New Act further expands conduct to business of the company or by any related person and 
even the powers of the directors that are being carried on in a manner that is unfairly oppressive 
and/or unfairly prejudicial to the applicant.
143
 As can be seen from the wording of the New Act, 
the requirements don‘t place emphasis on the conduct but rather the outcome of such conduct. 
In Grancy Property Ltd v Manala (Grancy)
144
 the court, when determining conduct, stated that it 
is not the motive of the conduct that is important but rather the effect that such conduct has had 
on the shareholder, thus allowing the court to have wider discretion when determining 
conduct.
145
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The above is a Supreme Court judgment and has shown that the need for protection is far greater 
than the reasons as to why such conduct, whether it was an act or an omission, was committed. 
Sibanda has alluded to the fact that inclusion of ‗unfairly disregards the interest of the applicant‘ 
brings about wider application and was not available under the Old Act
146
 and further states that 
this shows the importance of shareholders interest which are ‗wider‘ than shareholders rights and 
thus, includes legitimate expectations of shareholders.
147
 
In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries (Ebrahimi),
148
 the court stated that ‗legitimate expectations‘ 
are a sui generis class of rights that go beyond the scope of shareholders and that it is a 
relationship, of a personal nature, between individuals which will cause an unfair prejudice if it 
is not honored.
149
 
‗In Canada, federal and provincial statutes provide for dramatically broader Oppression remedies against Canadian 
corporations to address a potentially unlimited array of unfair conduct. Oppression claims can be asserted by 
practically any ‗stakeholder‘ for corporate actions that infringe on the stakeholder's legitimate expectations‘.150 
From this, we can see that other jurisdictions place high importance on the protection of 
shareholders by allowing broader application so that applicants stand a better chance of 
succeeding in their claims. This shows the broad application of the requirements in other 
jurisdictions that aim to encompass all situations which arise in a company relating to 
shareholders. The writer agrees with this insight and submits that it is a step to formulating a 
broad but controlled statute that will allow all parties to seek relief under the Act. 
With regards to the requirement of conduct, authors believe that the result should be a single 
result and not a multitude of results that need to occur.
151
 Here, the authors agreed with  the court 
in Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd 
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(Kudumane),
152
 which stated that the courts do not require that all results need to be eventuated, 
but just one is fulfillment of the requirements to seek remedial action under the New Act.
153
 
2.3.2.3. Remedies Available to the Court to Rectify the Misconduct 
Lastly, one of the major advances in the New Act
154
 is the extensive list of remedies that can be 
found under S163 (2).
155
 Sibanda points out that even though most of the remedies found therein 
involve minimal court intervention, it still allows the court to make decisions based on the facts 
before it.
156
 The court is also now able to grant interim orders pending finalization of a matter 
which the Old Act did not cater for.
157
 
In Louw,
158
 the court alluded to the fact that s252
159
 allowed courts wide discretionary abilities 
when it came to rectifying the wrong done to the applicant.
160
 The court further mentions that the 
relief that the court will grant must have the eventuality of ‗putting an end‘ to the conduct 
complained of.
161
 
The above, it is submitted shows that remedy placed its application in the hands of the court and 
lack of business skills and training on the part of the judiciary was never questioned. Each case 
was dealt with on a case-by-case basis and what one court could have found as justified may not 
have been the case by another. 
Under the Canada Business Corporations Act,
162
 the Oppression remedy grants courts 
discretionary capabilities to go beyond the technical legal rules which binds corporate 
shareholders and considers whether a complainant‘s reasonable expectations have been 
defeated.
163
 The discretion reaches as far as allowing the court to order that the corporation or 
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any other person, purchase securities, compensate an aggrieved person or order an appropriate 
remedy to rectify the contested issue by the oppressed party.
164
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Under s163 of the New Act
165
 not only encompasses protection for minority shareholders but 
also embraces the change that has been occurring in other, more progressive, jurisdictions.
166
 It 
shows growth and intention of legislature to bring South Africa‘s Company law on-par with 
other legal systems.
167
 The Oppression remedy has found itself developing and advancing, which 
shows the need and want for it to be a successful remedial action for disgruntled members of 
every rank and level. 
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CHAPTER 3: APPRAISAL RIGHTS AND DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS 
3.1. Introduction and Origin  
Dissenting shareholders‘ Appraisal right may be defined as 
‗the right of dissenting shareholders who do not approve of certain triggering events to have their shares bought out 
by the company in cash, at a price reflecting the fair value of the shares, which value in certain cases may be 
determined by the judiciary.‘
168
 
The review of current domestic company law was inevitable and much needed. The Department 
of Trade Industry brought about such review and proposed changes for company law that has not 
been changed since 1973 Old Act.
169
 One of South Africa‘s newest additions, in terms of 
minority protection, was the Appraisal right. It is adopted from developed jurisdictions such as 
the United States, New Zealand and, its most recent influencer, Canada.
170
 The need for 
protection of minority shareholders is ever-growing and developing to ensure that a majority 
decision, which may have adverse effects or cannot be stopped by a minority, has consequences 
in the eyes of the law. 
Prior to the enactment of the New Act,
171
 disgruntled minority shareholders found themselves in 
a dangerous position. The court in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd (Sammel)
172
 
set out the common law position which applied in South Africa as follows: 
‗By becoming a shareholder in a company, a person undertakes by his contract to be bound by the decisions of the 
prescribed majority of shareholders, if those decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at in accordance 
with the law, even where they adversely affect his own rights as a shareholder. The principle of the supremacy of the 
majority is essential to the proper functioning of companies‘
173
 
The above reasoned the reluctant attitude courts adopted when it came to interfering or involving 
itself in the internal management of any company.
174
 The granting of an Appraisal right sought to 
balance the unfair restriction placed on a company when deciding to make any fundamental 
                                                          
168
 FHI Cassim et al op cit note 2 at 796. 
169
 FHI Cassim ‗Unravelling the obscurities of section 38(2)(d) of the Companies Act‘ (2005)122 (3) South African 
Law Journal 493. 
170
 Ibid. 
171
 Act 71 of 2008. 
172
 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) 678. 
173
 Ibid 678 G-H; see also J Yeats op cit note 47 at 336.  
174
 Communicare v Khan 2013 (4) SA 482 (SCA) para 10. 
 27 
 
change. It was previously required that there is not only a majority vote but a ‗unanimous 
vote‘175 for such change to be implemented.176 The law now allows the rights attached to the 
initially purchased shares be held in sanctity and allows the shareholder the right to protect such 
investment interest and the economic risk associated with such share.
177
 This equalises the 
economic arena by not only protecting critical economic change but allowing those involved in 
such change the choice to be attached or detached from such.
178
 
The once historical requirement of a ‗unanimous vote‘ was required for mergers and other 
fundamental transactions and was finally replaced by ‗majority vote‘ as the new standard.179 The 
majority approval sufficed and, as a quid pro quo,
180
 the dissenting or disgruntled shareholders 
are afforded the Appraisal right.
181
 This can be seen as a remedy to their inability to refuse or 
object to being a part of the majority decision.
182
 
The ‗defeated expectations‘183 view was a consequence that many dissenting shareholders 
endured if they were unable to leave the company amicably, by having their shares bought out, 
but was forced into the new transaction.
184
 The introduction of cash-out as a merger 
consideration also prevents the dissenting shareholders from being inadequately paid out and 
thus, can be seen as a ‗remedy-for-unfairness‘ justification.185 
The Appraisal remedy now gives the minority an option, one which they were previously not 
entitled to, to have their shares bought out for a ‗fair value‘ and allow themselves the freedom to 
be in a business that they wish to be a part as opposed to being forced due to financial 
differences.
186
 The Appraisal right not only protects the minority, but also allows internal 
management the tractability it requires to adapt to the ever-changing economic environment and 
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thus, protects the majority, the decision making process of such majority and their voted 
decision.
187
 
The Appraisal right can be seen as a defense for dissenting shareholders, but also as a benchmark 
for directors or controlling majorities to be wary and avoid making risky business decisions that 
may eventually have consequences on the minority.
188
 It should be recognised by directors or 
majority shareholders that the dissenting vote is also of importance when making business 
decisions. A company should pay attention to not only the majority way of thinking but the 
minority as well, as majority shareholders may have money to lose but a minority may not and 
thus, if there is a greater number of dissenting shareholders votes than there are majority 
shareholders votes, this should be a warning beacon to the majority of the decision that is going 
to made and that it needs to be reviewed.
189
 
The above indicates the three main objectives of the Appraisal right; 
1. Facilitates the market for conducive mergers; 
2. provides liquidity for dissenting shareholders; and  
3. serves as a check on opportunism by the directors and the controlling shareholders.190 
From the above there are three main objectives that can be deduced; namely, the option of 
having shares bought for a ‗fair market‘ value provided all the requirements under the Appraisal 
right are complied with.
191
 The second objective enables the once-feared judicial intervention 
should the value be inadequate or the shareholder require the court to determine ‗fair market 
value‘.192 The third objective is to disallow a director from making decisions that may have an 
adverse effect on the minority, by curtailing the freedom that a director can attain by title.
193
 
It has been stated that, provided the majority follow the correct protocols and pay the dissenting 
shareholders, they can implement any fundamental change with impunity. As the minority would 
be able to avoid being party to change that they don‘t agree with, however, if enough 
shareholders objected to the resolution being passed they can actively ‗force-stop‘ the change 
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from occurring.
194
 The above could be possible, as the obligation to purchase the shares could 
inevitably drain the company‘s funds.195 The Appraisal right has been said to have many 
concerns on the part of majority shareholders such as ‗frightful drain, burden and nuisance‘ that 
comes with the remedy.
196
 
The Appraisal statutes can be seen as a ‗barricade‘ for minority rights or as a tool to enable a 
faster means of ‗majoritarianism‘ all dependent on its application and management.197 It also 
encourages investors with small capital input to invest knowing that they would be adequately 
protected against a majority reign.
198
 
3.2 Appraisal Remedy and its Application Under s164 
The Appraisal right makes its first appearance in domestic company law under the New Act.
199
 It 
has seen long-standing application under many foreign jurisdictions and has recent application in 
Canada and New Zealand.
200
 
The Appraisal remedy, as stated above, is a crucial remedy for dissenting shareholders who are 
challenged with unfairness in a company.
201
 Hence, if a dissenting shareholder is offered an 
amount for their shares in a company and is dissatisfied with said amount, (s)he may now 
challenge the fair value of the offer judicially.
202
 As with every piece of legislature, there is a 
downside for applicants seeking relief under this section, as the remedy has been criticised for 
being expensive, time-consuming and procedurally dreadful.
203
 The remedy is based on strict 
compliance and is technical in nature.
204
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Due to this, there is a fine line between effectiveness and, essentially, from the protection that it 
should be able to afford the minority.
205
 It has been argued that the Appraisal procedure needs to 
be followed meticulously to find application and this can be seen as a deterrent to potential 
applicants.
206
 
Despite the above, the Appraisal remedy is seen as a means of not only protecting the minority 
but, allowing the majority the freedom it requires to conclude desired transactions without 
having to avoid potential successes due to fear of the minority rising up for reasons unbeknown 
or that are personal in nature. 
To find application under s164, it is a pre-requisite that certain triggering events need to unfold 
before this right is applicable, as it does not have general application.
207
 An Appraisal right is 
triggered when a notice is given by a company to shareholders indicating that a meeting will be 
held to adopt a crucial change.
208
 Included in such a notice should be an indication of the 
shareholders‘ rights possessed under this section.209 It should be noted that business rescue 
procedures are exempt under this section.
210
 
Under Canadian corporate law, the Appraisal right is addressed as the ‗Procedural Morass‘.211 Its 
adoption was also founded on the new merger provisions and to enable flexible and an efficient 
economy.
212
 Legislature has borrowed a large part of the Canadian jurisprudence when drafting 
the Appraisal right under the New Act.
213
 The CCBA
214
 created the equivalent Appraisal right on 
the basis that it not only protect the minority against discrimination, but also conserves flexibility 
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in order to facilitate company change.
215
 We find great similarity in terms of legal principles set 
out under of s190 of the CBCA and in s164 regarding locus standi.
216
 
The Appraisal remedy does have initial safe-guards that need to be met prior to the Appraisal 
right being applicable. This can be seen as a preliminary enquiry before the penultimate right can 
be activated. The Applicant, in essence, needs to ‗perfect‘ the Appraisal right in order to find 
application under this section.
217
 This entails that the dissenting shareholder actually votes 
against the resolution and, thereafter, is required to provide written demand that his/her shares be 
bought out at a fair market value.
218
 This is done once the resolution has been implemented and 
all procedural requirements, in terms of this section, are complied with.
219
 
The additional requirement, which was called the ‗no Appraisal threshold‘,220 stated that there 
needed to be an approved majority vote of less than 75 percent.
221
 This had been criticised as 
being a vehicle towards unfairness against the dissenting shareholder(s). For example, the 
majority shareholder has controlling shares of 75 percent or more to be voted.
222
 This had 
detrimental effects to the Appraisal right by giving no application to the Appraisal right for a 
dissenting shareholder, hence the abandonment of the requirement.
223
 
3.3 Trigger Events to Initiate the Appraisal Right 
The Appraisal right is not a general right and is only triggered in certain circumstances. The 
Appraisal right is only triggered under circumstances when the company proposes to pass a 
special resolution to: 
1. ‗Dispose of all or the greater part of its assets or undertaking; 
2. Enter into an amalgamation or merger; 
3. Implement a scheme or arrangement; or 
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4. Amend its Memorandum of Incorporation by changing the preferences, rights, 
limitations or other terms of any class of its shares in any manner materially adverse 
to the rights or the interests of holders of that class of shares (as contemplated in 
Section 37(8) of the Act‘.224 
The Appraisal right is not driven by ‗fault or unfairness‘,225 as seen with the Oppression remedy 
under s163 of the New Act. It is important to note that the dissenting shareholder is only entitled 
to demand the fair value of his shares if a resolution which effects change is adopted. However, a 
dissenting shareholder has the responsibility of making his objection to a proposed resolution, 
known to the company, as soon as he is aware of the said proposed resolution.
226
 Surprisingly, 
there is no differentiation between public and private companies, even considering the fact that a 
dissenting shareholder of a public company has the option of selling their shares on an open 
market. Section 164(1) read with Section 152 of the act specifically excludes any transaction, 
agreement or offer which relates to a business rescue plan that has been approved by the 
shareholders of the company.
227
 
3.4 Procedural Requirements of the Appraisal Remedy 
As elaborated on above, for successful application of the Appraisal right certain requirements 
need to be complied with as set out in s164 of the New Act.
228
 It requires meticulous timing, 
accuracy and full compliancy. In terms of the CBCA, it is fundamental that the shareholder 
comply with all the requirements which include notices and deadlines; failure results in the 
shareholders being ‗disentitled‘ from finding application in terms of his or her Appraisal right.229 
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3.4.1 Legal Standing 
It should be common cause but noteworthy that Beukes points out, for a shareholder to find 
application under s164 (s)he needs to be a shareholder and has to dissent.
230
 In terms of s1 of the 
New Act, a shareholder is defined as a ‗holder of a share issued by a company‘231 and a share is 
defined as ‗one of the units into which the proprietary interest in a profit company is divided‘.232 
The New Act does not include in the term shareholders, a member of non-profit organisation‘s 
(hereinafter referred to as NGOs), however, it will apply to the non-profit organisation should 
such an organisation have shares in a profit company.
233
 
The final requirement relates to one of the trigger events, the alteration of a class of rights in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation and the shareholders need to be holders of the class of rights that 
will be affected by the alteration.
234
 
Under Canadian jurisprudence, it is a general rule that in order to use the Appraisal right the 
person needed to be a registered shareholder at the time the resolution is passed.
235
 Courts have 
not followed this rule strictly and have taken a relaxed approach when dealing with legal 
standing.
236
 One such case is Silber v BRG Precious Metals Inc (Silber),
237
 whereby the court 
granted the dissidents the Appraisal right even though the court was mindful of the fact that they 
had attained the title of shareholder after the notice of the proposed meeting had already been 
handed. Hence, it was argued that the Appraisal right was not correctly applicable.
238
 This is a 
clear example of court discretion and judicial interpretation which gives effect to the Appraisal 
right; however, it can be seen as way of distorting the principle and allowing unsuccessful, 
meritless claims instead of being an effective mechanism of governing corporate authority.
239
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Canadian courts have followed the view that, should the directors of controlling powers intend 
on limiting the Appraisal right to shareholders at the time the notice is sent out, they should 
actively take steps to indicate such intention in the notice.
240
 
In comparison to domestic corporate law, the New Act is very specific and limits the Appraisal 
right to shareholders that are in the share register and/or the a record date, allocated by the 
company, for determining the standing that shareholders may or may not have.
241
 Thus, if a 
shareholder becomes registered after the notice, but before the resolution is passed, the 
shareholder fulfils the requirements under s164.
242
 For example, which shareholders are entitled 
to receive notice of meetings and are competent to participate in such a meeting.
243
 Should the 
board fail to set such a date, the court will determine the date as being the last date by which the 
company needs to give notice.
244
 It should be noted that shareholders who have acquired a 
beneficial interest subsequently are entitled to vote provided the shareholder‘s name is in the 
share register.
245
 
A noteworthy domestic case is Abraham Albertus Cilliers v LA Concorde Holdings Ltd.
246
 Here 
the court was required to determine the ability of a holding company to make an application 
under s164, should the subordinate company ‗dispose of all of a greater part of its assets‘.247 
A brief factual background to the case involved Mr. A. Cilliers, a minority shareholder in La 
Concorde Holdings Ltd an application against Respondent and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 
KWV South Africa (Pty) Ltd among others, in terms of which he sought to enforce his attempted 
exercise of his Appraisal rights against La Concorde.
248
 KWV wished to dispose of all its 
operational assets to a third party.
249
 This constituted the disposal of all or the greater part of the 
assets of both KWV and La Concorde. Accordingly, in terms of the New Act, the proposed 
disposal needed to be approved by special resolutions of the shareholders of both the holding 
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company and its subsidiary. Cilliers objected and voted against the proposed disposal. Cilliers 
then sought to exercise his Appraisal rights under s164 of the New Act and demanded that La 
Concorde pay the fair value for his shares in La Concorde. La Concorde refused to do so. La 
Concorde argued that the Appraisal rights in s164 did not extend to the shareholders of the 
holding company who voted against the proposed disposal and that s164 remedies were only 
available to the shareholders of the company disposing of all or the greater part of its assets, 
namely KWV. The court, in reaching its decision, took into consideration the interpretation of 
statutes and quoted the Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v N Endumeni Municipality (Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund)
250
 case. The court, in coming to its conclusion, made noteworthy 
remarks regarding the applicability of the Appraisal remedy and its application by clearly stating 
the need for growth and fairness as stated in the constitution makes it imperative that the words 
of legislature are read to give effect to such objectives.
251
 The court also took into consideration 
the mere intention of legislature and pointed out the following: 
‗In my view, as a starting point, the only sensible meaning to be ascribed to the phrase, ‗the 
holder of any voting rights in a company‘, taking into account its context, purpose, and 
background of the Act, is exactly what it says, in plain language, and must be what the legislature 
intended it to mean. If the legislature intended the meaning of ‗the holder of any voting rights in a 
company‘ to be limited to ‗the holder of voting rights in the disposing company‘, it would have 
simply said so. There is in my view, no ambiguity in the Section, nor is there any uncertainty 
about it that requires an interpretation, other than the plain meaning. It is more the correct 
application than the interpretation of the law‘.252 
The above is a clear indication of the courts focus on adequate and effective application of the 
Appraisal remedy. It also points out an important aspect of proper protection of all shareholders 
who might be affected by a decision they voted against. The court rightfully allowed the 
applicant relief under the Appraisal remedy and this is not only an expansion on the requirements 
set out in the New Act but also a message to all controlling companies regarding the importance 
of proper decision making and decision-making information that needs to be given to not only 
the company to which the proposed change is aimed at but all the companies that may be 
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affected by such change. The court indicated an outstanding reason for this by stating the 
following: 
In the 2007 Company‘s Bill, published by the Department of Trade and Industry, the intention of the 
Legislature is recorded in the following terms: 
‗3. Corporate efficiency … (c) there should be a remedy to avoid locking in minorities 
shareholders in inefficient companies. … 
4. Transparency … (c) the law should protect shareholder rights, advance shareholder activism, 
and provide enhanced protections for minority shareholders…’253 
The above case illustrates the immense want for the successful and all rounded application of the 
Appraisal right rather than limiting it to such an extent that the purpose and aim is partially or 
completely lost. 
 3.4.2 Notice of the Right 
In terms of s164 of the New Act, it does not require the company to give prior notice of the place 
where the meeting will be held to discuss the proposed resolution, however, it does require that 
the company, in terms of s164(2), indicate the right that the shareholder has in terms of the 
Appraisal remedy.
254
 This is not as simple when the company intends on disposing of all or a 
greater part of the assets and/or undertakings of a company.
255
 
The New Act does not give a prescribed form of notice that must be followed, however, s65(4) 
of the New Act indicates that the proposed resolution needs to be set out ‗clearly, sufficiently 
and include sufficient material to enable the shareholders to vote on said resolution‘.256 In terms 
of s6(4)(b), if there is no prescribed form for the notice, it must be done so in ‗plain language‘.257 
Plain language is competent for ‗prospectus, notice, disclosure or a document, if the company‘s 
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shareholders who shall read such are reasonably expected to understand and comprehend such 
language‘.258 
If the company fails to give reference to s164 or does not fulfil the requirements set out in s6(4), 
the notice will be materially defective, however, be that as it may, all shareholders who had 
accepted the notice and are present at the meeting do possess the capability of ratifying such 
defect and the meeting will continue as planned.
259
 Should the risk arise that a dissenting 
shareholder not be willing to ratify such defect, and the defect is with regards to a certain aspect, 
such defect can be removed  in accordance with s62(5)(a), and the notice will remain valid.
260
 
In relation to Canadian Jurisprudence, s190(5) of the CBCA requires adequate information on 
the Appraisal right to be given to the shareholders and one of the important aspects that needs to 
be pointed out clearly is the right to cash-out element.
261
 Canadian courts have further pointed 
out that giving an indication that the shareholders are allowed to vote against the resolution does 
not qualify as sufficient notice.
262
 
 3.4.3 Notice of Objection by Dissenting Shareholder(s) 
Once notice has been sent out and shareholders have intention of voting against the resolution, 
there is an obligation placed on such dissenting shareholders to indicate such intention, in terms 
of s164(3), by way of ‗written‘ notice, prior to the resolution being voted on.263 
Academics have pointed out that in terms of s164(5)(a)(i), a dissenting shareholder is allowed to 
demand payment if the notice of objection was ‗sent‘, this makes no indication of the 
requirement that notice has to be ‗written‘.264 This is a strange analysis as it is further pointed out 
that the notice can also be sent via voice message.
265
 One of the reasons given for the suggested 
‗written notice‘ of objection is mere courtesy, on the part of both parties, whereby the dissenting 
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shareholders has adequately informed the majority and the majority in return will notify the 
dissenting shareholders when the resolution has been passed.
266
 
In terms of Canadian jurisprudence, it has been stated that there is a possibility that if the notice 
is given after the fact, shareholders might be influenced or intimidated by the number of votes 
for the resolution and eventually back out of objecting.
267
 In terms of s190(5) of the CBCA the 
objection needs to be done at the proposed meeting or prior to the proposed meeting being 
held.
268
 
In terms of s164(3), written notice ‗may‘ be given prior to the meeting and even though the 
requirement seems laidback, it should not be overlooked as, should the dissenting shareholders 
fail to give such notice, they may stand the possibility of losing the Appraisal right.
269
 An 
explanation for the word ‗may‘ could be found in the mere fact that the dissenting shareholders 
have not received the notice or that they cannot make such a decision because they are simply 
unaware of their rights under s164.
270
 If the dissenting shareholders fail to give the required 
notice of objection, they are obliged to do so at the earliest time before the resolution is to be put 
to a vote.
271
 
A dissenting shareholder‘s presence at the proposed meeting is not required by s164, however, in 
terms of s37(8)(b), it is mandatory due to the nature and effect of the meeting‘s agenda.272 It is 
important to note that if a dissenting shareholder intends on objecting, they should do so in full. 
The New Act makes no provision for ‗partial dissent‘ and thus, is unclear. However, legislature 
has worded s164(5) to mean ‗all shares‘ which may indicate that the shareholder may not be 
allowed to demand that certain shares of theirs are to be bought and not in its entirety.
273
 Thus, a 
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shareholder may not be able to use some of his voting rights for the resolution and some 
against.
274
 
In terms of Canadian jurisprudence, it is quite the opposite. The CBCA authorises partial dissent, 
as s190(4) stipulates that a dissident may be able to dissent on a class of shares. Thus, if 
shareholders have other class shares, the Appraisal right will be operable only on the class that 
the shareholders choose to appraise.
275
 Some case considerations have allowed an ‗informal 
letter‘ as a means of notifying the company of the objection and found in favour of dissidents.276 
 3.4.4. Notice of Adoption of the Resolution 
The Appraisal right is only afforded if there is a trigger event. In terms of the New Act under 
s164(9)(c) a company can revoke the resolution at any time and thus, the right will no longer be 
applicable.
277
 The right also is subsequently no longer applicable if at the meeting the dissenting 
shareholders decide that they will no longer be objecting or withdraws their demand.
278
 Canadian 
jurisprudence requires a simple ‗stop‘ in any further Appraisal proceedings on the part of 
dissent.
279
 
Once the meeting has finalised and the resolution has been adopted, the New Act requires that 
notice be given within ten business days.
280
 This notice also needs to be circulated amongst those 
shareholders who have either objected, withdrew the notice or voted in favour of the 
resolution.
281
 However, should notice not be given the company will not endure any adverse 
effects.
282
 
3.4.5. Demand 
At this stage, the dissenting shareholders would have complied with all the procedural 
requirements relating to the Appraisal right. The resolution, in theory, has been adopted and the 
dissenting shareholders can now demand that the company buy them out by purchasing the 
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shares they acquired. To be successful in the demand process, the dissenting shareholders must 
have complied with the following: 
1. ‗The shareholder must have sent a notice of objection; 
2. Subsequent to the above, the resolution must have been adopted by the company; 
3. The dissenting shareholder must have voted against the resolution, as abstinence in the 
voting process will not suffice; 
4. The dissenting shareholder must have complied with all the procedural requirements of 
Section 164; and 
5. In the event of an amendment of the company‘s Memorandum of Incorporation in order 
to alter a class of rights, the dissenting shareholder must hOldshares of a class that is 
materially and adversely affected by the amendment‘.283 
It is noteworthy that prior to the enactment of the New Act the draft bill required, as stated 
earlier in this chapter, a less than 75 percent support of the resolution threshold and thus, if this 
was exceeded, the dissenting shareholders had lost all right to make such demand.
284
 Once the 
abovementioned requirements are fulfilled in its entirety, the dissident, in terms of s 164(7), must 
deliver the demand to the company within twenty business days after receiving a notice of 
adoption of the resolution or failing receipt of same by the shareholder, within twenty business 
days after learning of the adoption of such a resolution.
285
 
It should be clear at this stage that the dissident has no intention to be party to the company‘s 
transactions and thus, legislature has stated that once the demand has been given, the dissident 
ceases to have any rights with regards to the shares, other than to be paid out a fair market 
value.
286
 Canadian courts have allowed shareholders the right to challenge oppressive actions.
287
 
It has been suggested that, should domestic legislature incorporate this view, dissenting 
shareholders may still be able to apply for s163 ‗Oppression remedy‘ recourse, even after the 
demand is given.
288
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3.4.6. Offer by the Company 
Once the demand is sent, the company needs to revert to the dissenting shareholders, within a 
period of five days, preceding the demand with an offer that is to be determined by the directors 
at a fair market value price. Such price will use the date and time prior to which resolution was 
passed and afforded the dissenting shareholders the Appraisal right.
289
 The offer needs to be 
specific to the shares that are demanded to be purchased by the company.
290
 The offer, if made, 
lapses within a period of 30 days from the date after the offer is made.
291
 
Canadian case law has pointed out a crucial aspect with regards to the offer that is given to the 
dissident. The offer needs to be a true fair value offer and not what the company views as a 
minimum value. Thus, the value needs to be appropriate in accordance with the economic 
standpoint at the time that the offer is made.
292
 
It is noteworthy, as stated before, that the company suffers no consequence should written notice 
not be adequately sent to dissenting shareholders, if at all.
293
 This shows a legislative oversight 
or an ‗imbalance‘ of requirements. The right in itself offers no protection against unfairness and 
deliberate hindrance on the part of the controlling parties of the company.
294
 
The disadvantage that the company suffers is the eventuality of not being able to afford the 
amount that the dissenting shareholders are entitled to for a number of reasons.
295
 If the offer is 
inadequate, the dissenting shareholders may apply for judicial intervention for the determination 
of fair market value, provided that the offer has not prescribed.
296
 The right to appear before a 
judicial officer is not automatic and only occurs when conflict arises between the dissenting 
shareholders and the company when determining what fair market value should be.
297
 It has been 
suggested by Cassim
298
 that this is one of the ‗finer structures‘ available with the Appraisal right. 
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This application will be curtailed if the offer was duly accepted, however, the dissenting 
shareholders that did not accept it will join the application and the court may also instruct that 
certain parties be joined, even after the application has been moved.
299
 
The above is a great possibility and legislature does afford the company adequate protection 
against such eventuality. The offer needs to be a fair market value, regardless of the company‘s 
ability to pay, however, once the offer is accepted, the company may apply to court to have the 
obligation varied on reasonable grounds that the company is unable to pay its debts within the 
next year.
300
 We can see at this stage that there are a limited number of outcomes when the offer 
is made and should the offer be adequate it will be accepted and, if not, the dissenting 
shareholders do have the option of judicial intervention for determination of such. 
3.4.7. Acceptance of the Offer 
Once an offer is made, provided that the dissenting shareholders find the offer appropriate and 
suitable to the fair market value, the offer must be duly accepted.
301
 At this point the dissenting 
shareholder has accepted his/her exit and upon doing so needs to give to the company what was 
purchased. There are in fact two eventualities that will follow dependent on the type of shares the 
dissenting shareholders obtained by becoming a shareholder of said company. 
In terms of s164(13)(a); the shareholder must either in the case of- 
(i) shares evidenced by certificates, tender the relevant share certificates to the company 
or the company‘s transfer agent; or 
(ii) uncertified shares, take the steps required in terms of section 53 to direct the transfer 
of those shares to the company or the company‘s transfer agent.‘302 
From the wording set out in the New Act and judicial interpretation, we can deduce that the offer 
need not be accepted via written notice but rather by the handing over of the once-acquired 
shares.
303
 It should be duly noted that courts will not endorse the Appraisal right of dissenting 
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shareholders who use the remedy to frustrate the ‗Sovereigns legitimate business strategies and 
initiatives.
304
 If this is found to be the issue, the court will order that the shares be reinstated to 
the dissenting shareholders.
305
 
The dissenting shareholder upon acceptance will have to tender their shares, within a period of 
30 days, in order for the offer to not lapse.
306
 The company, once notified of the acceptance, will 
have a period of ten days to pay out the amount that was offered if not the offer will lapse and 
the dissenting shareholders will be put in the same position they were in prior to the dissent.
307
 
The next part of this dissertation shall explore the scenario of the offer not being accepted by the 
dissenting shareholders as the amount that is offered by the company is seen as inappropriate, 
insufficient or not made at all. 
3.4.8 Determination of ‘Fair Market Value’ 
The point of the Appraisal right is to allow the dissenting shareholders the ability to avoid a risk 
that they no longer want to be associated with.
308
 If the Appraisal right allows risks in the 
application of the right the intention and purpose of the remedy would be, in effect, futile. Hence, 
legislature when drafting afforded the appraiser the right to approach courts, prior to the offer 
lapsing,
309
 for a determination of what the offer can be and not what the offer is. The New Act 
further iterates that importance of ‗fair‘ by allowing the courts to make an order that shall affect 
the payment and avoid any further detriment or frustration on the part of the dissenting 
shareholders.
310
 
It should be noted at the start that there is no standard method that the court may apply when 
determining ‗fair value‘. It has been suggested that ‗fair value‘ is not one value but comprises of 
numerous values and the court will determine, in terms of legislature, ‗a fair value‘ and not ‗the 
fair value‘.311 This illustrates the lack in definition with regards to what can be regarded as a ‗fair 
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value‘. It has been stated by authors such as Yeats312 that the burden of proving that the value 
made is in actual fact fair, is in the controlling hands of the company and this has to be shown to 
the court. 
The court, in addition, will have to make further orders, relating to the shareholders, when 
required to determining fair value. These orders will comprise of the following: 
 ‗requiring the dissenting shareholders to either accept the ‗fair value‘ determined 
and execute due transfer or withdraw their demands; 
 requiring the company to pay such ‗fair value‘ to each dissenting shareholder who 
has accepted the determination and transferred their respective shares back to the 
company‘.313 
The above shows the mutual relationship that the company and shareholders have, which is 
founded on the acquisition of shares. Even though the court will make a determination on the 
requested ‗fair value‘, should there be an unwillingness of the part of all or some of the 
dissenting shareholders to accept such determined value, they will be reinstated as shareholders 
of the company as it has been reconstructed and with that will be the associated risks and 
changes the dissenting shareholders sought to avoid.
314
 Thus, concluding the objection on the 
part of the dissenting shareholders.  
The Appraisal remedy is a very well-constructed but inadequately legislated piece of work. It has 
the ability to be a great source of protection for dissenting shareholders, however, the lack of 
proper direction may lead to its evitable detriment. 
3.5. Conclusion 
As seen above, the Appraisal right is a fairly new and ‗interpretive‘ piece of legislation. It is a 
first-world remedy that now finds its application in our domestic law. Its procedure is technical 
and rigid and allows no flaws however, it is not widely used in South Africa yet, and hopefully 
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the courts and the legal minds will be able to makes its application easy, efficient and less 
restrictive. 
The positive aspect of its introduction into our domestic law is the ‗option‘ that it now gives 
shareholders. In some cases, a company will not be able to function if shareholders had not 
invested and seen hope and a good market choice when investing. This now allows shareholders 
the ability to remove themselves from a once good investment to a current bad investment based 
on eventualities that investors hate to predict.  
The Appraisal right shows promise however, it does not cater for all-round protection. The 
remedy, as seen above, places very little to no consequences on a company as a whole and yet 
this is what the purpose of the remedy is -  to make the controlling parties answerable and liable 
for their misdemeanors and cut-throat business attitudes. 
The other problem with the Appraisal right is the notice requirements its lacks rigidity and is too 
broad. It allows room for frustration and encourages futile time wastage on the part of either 
party. The notice requirements should be the most stressed function of any right as this allows 
the other party to adequately prepare and from the name itself, ‗appraise themselves‘ on the 
progress of their right application. 
The remedy, as stated above, is new and its development shall be shown in time and practice, 
however, the real question still remains as to whether it is warranted in our domestic law or not. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The economic environment is complex and competitive however, fair competition and decision 
making is crucial for its well-balanced existence. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 sought to 
combine both fair conduct and beneficial gain by providing a comprehensive and detailed set of 
rules and procedures to govern such conduct. The corporate sector in South Africa is ever-
growing hence the need for a diverse and inclusive legal system that allows for wide application. 
This can be seen by the extension of the Oppression remedy under section 163 and the inclusion 
of the Appraisal remedy under section 164. 
The application and content of the two remedial processes have been discussed in the previous 
chapters thus leading to two critical questions: 
4.1.1 Is the extension of the Oppression remedy found under section 163 of the 
New Companies Act warranted in South Africa? and 
4.1.2 Is the inclusion of the Appraisal remedy found under section 164 of the 
New Companies Act warranted in South Africa? 
 
4.1. The Extension of the Oppression Remedy 
The extension of Oppression remedy is warranted and much needed. The problem arises when 
applied. Its predecessor Acts have been seen as restrictive, narrow and not accommodating to all 
shareholders that have been wronged or experienced foul-play during the decision-making 
process. The New Act not only encompasses the need for local trust between shareholders but 
also allows foreign shareholders, future or current, to feel protected and thus encourages foreign 
investment and faith in our legal system. 
The above is true and reflected the need for reform. As stated in chapter two the Oppression 
remedy is now far-reaching, not only in its application, but in the wording that forms part of the 
New Act. This shows growth and understanding on the part of legislature of the economic 
sphere. It has now realised the reality that not only minority shareholders can experience 
unfairness but also those who form part of the majority but who are not in agreement with the 
rest of the board. Thus, the extension of locus standi to not just members but broadly 
shareholders inclusive of directors of a company, who may utilise this remedial process, if they 
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find themselves disgruntled. One of the first cases to deal with the Oppression remedy is the Peel 
case.
315
 Here the court dealt with a unique and complex set of facts which lead to authors
316
 
disagreeing with the court‘s findings. 
The facts, in summary, dealt with the applicants contending that the respondents had conducted 
themselves in a manner that was unfairly prejudicial and had a result that disregarded their 
interests. The crux of the matter dealt with Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). The 
Applicants intended to join the respondent‘s business which was to be beneficial for both parties. 
The respondent also had a good reputation preceding them with regards to BEE compliance. The 
relationship deteriorated to such an extent that both parties no longer wanted to be in business 
together. The dispute arose from a number of ‗sham transactions‘317 that the respondent 
concluded to attain a BEE score card. The court then had to determine on what basis s163 
applied. 
Legal Scholars such as Beukes, HGJ and Swart
318
 disagree with the finding by the court in 
relation to the application of s163. They are of the opinion that the applicants did not prove that 
the conduct complained of had the result of unjustly disregarding their interests, which is 
required by s163(1) of the New Act. This, in summary, meant that the applicants did not abide by 
the requirements that are set out in the New Act. 
The court, however, took a different approach to the above and found the following: 
1. Credibility is vital to ensure that a business continues as a successful concern and that the 
respondents did not dispute the allegation made by the applicant that the BEE transaction 
was a sham.
319
 
2. Non-disclosure of the improper BEE transaction and the fact that is has not been resolved 
meant that the respondents conduct was unfairly prejudicial to applicants and unfairly 
disregarded their interests.
320
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3. The fact that the BEE transaction was a sham meant that the applicants‘ reputation would 
be tainted should they continue business with the respondents and thus, the exposure to 
such serious risks on the applicants amounted to an unfair prejudice or disregard of the 
applicant‘s interests.321 
On the face of it, it would seem that the court had applied s163 correctly however, after further 
analysis by academic authors it would not seem so apparent. The court broadly applied s163 and 
stated ‗...broaden relief rather than limit it‘322 and this is what the abovementioned authors 
disagreed with.  These scholars are of the opinion that even though the court was correct in 
broadening the remedy, it was incorrect by applying it to applicants who failed to prove the 
requirements set out in s163(1). They stated the following: 
The Oppression remedy is available only if an act or omission by a company or a person related to the 
company has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests 
of a shareholder or a director of the company; or if the carrying on of the business of the company, or the 
exercising of the powers of a director or a prescribed officer of the company is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to a shareholder or a director of the company. Relief cannot be granted in terms of subsection 
(2) where the requirements of subsection (1) – the specified statutory criteria - have not been satisfied.‘323 
From the above, it is deduced that these legal scholars felt that the court had erred in finding 
application of s163 in this case and the fact that it is legislatives intention to broaden relief, the 
requirements that need to be met to find such application should not be ignored. The reason for 
the authors‘ disagreement is twofold; 
1. The applicants were not shareholders or directors at the time that the conduct complained 
of occurred and that they had joined after the fact.
324
 
2. The result that the court felt unfairly disregarded the applicant‘s interests did not occur 
but was a speculation on future events should the applicants stay in business with the 
respondent, such result was not apparent but as stated speculative. The authors also felt 
that the fact that the court considered serious risk as a result could have detrimental 
                                                          
321
 Ibid para 22. 
322
 Ibid para 52. 
323
 HGJ Beukes HGJ & WJC Swart op cit note 100 at 1697.  
324
 Ibid at 1700. 
 49 
 
effects on the proper functioning of the remedy.
325
 This meant that the applicants had 
relied on misrepresentation on the part of the respondent and this did not fulfill the 
requirements under s163.
326
 
In conclusion, these legal scholars felt this case should not be regarded as authority for 
shareholders who want to find application under the Oppression remedy as it clearly indicates 
that the applicant is not required to be a shareholders or director at the time the conduct 
complained of is committed. This is rather an example of how a company can be exposed by a 
related person how important it is for the company to assess how the conduct of other companies 
in the group will impact it. 
Cassim
327
 is also of the opinion that in order for an applicant to find success under this remedy, 
the conduct that is complained of needs to be either, conduct that has already occurred or 
conduct which has been occurring and that there is no room under this section for conduct that is 
yet to be done.
328
 
The above shows consistency in the way academic writers interpret the New Act and that the 
court, in some instances, may apply it incorrectly. This not only shows the need for clearer 
legislative writing but also the need for proper guidance and training on judicial level to ensure 
that acts are being applied correctly and not misinterpreted. 
In more recent case law, it has been stated that the court is not required to look at the motive of 
the alleged conduct but rather the conduct itself and examine the effect that such conduct has had 
on the applicants or other members of the company.
329
 It has further been stated that the 
applicant cannot found his or her allegation on grounds that are not founded or leave the court to 
determine the risks associated with such anticipated Oppression.
330
 The courts have integrated 
the interpretational approach of the word ‗conduct‘ which previous courts dealing with the 
remedy, under the Old Act, took. In Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd (Five Minute Car 
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Wash) 
331
 the court stated that the loss of confidence in a company‘s dealings does not render the 
company acting in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial or oppressive.
332
 
The above shows the court following a restrictive approach to the Oppression remedy by 
envisioning the thoughts of various academic approaches to the remedy‘s requirements. It also 
shows that judicial certainty is attained by continuous and consistent application and 
interpretation. It further indicates the unwillingness of courts to accept anticipated Oppression 
and their willingness to restrict the remedy to avoid misuse. 
The Oppression remedy in other jurisdictions is far wider in application than the remedy found 
under our New Act however, it is, in my opinion, that time and thorough juristic application will 
either insist on further extension or approve of its current standing in our law. The current 
position needs to however, be applied with accuracy and ensure that the intention of legislature is 
met. The courts should not allow the remedy to be misused and the floodgates to be opened to 
persons who cannot be rightful applicants just because legislature intended the New act to be 
broader than its predecessor acts. There are certain requirements and guidelines which need to be 
complied with first. 
4.1.2 Recommendations  
The Oppression remedy has undergone much development in terms of the New Act. The writer 
is of the view that there need not be any further changes to the act but rather clarity with regards 
to issues such as locus standi, and the concept of anticipated Oppression. It seems as though 
legislature had an idea of how to correct the Oppression remedy but not on how judiciary may 
apply it. As can be seen above too much judicial discretion may lead to much uncertainty, as 
what one may court may deem as falling within the scope of the remedy, another may not. 
The writer submits that should the remedy be available to non-members/shareholders it would 
lead to external interference on the controlling parties. As the controlling members have more 
factual knowledge on the daily running of the business and the reasons behind their decisions, 
which may not always be accompanied by immediate gain. This will lead to companies opening 
up their decision-making process to the public for scrutiny. 
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The concept of anticipated Oppression is a term that cannot be tamed. There are always risks 
involved in the business sphere and for the New Act to cover all such eventualities is near 
impossible and would detract from the remedy‘s main purpose and aim, which is to protect 
shareholders when they are disgruntled and not when they think they ‗may be‘ disgruntled. This 
will allow numerous claims to be lodged and extensive court investigation into matters that may 
not have any cause. This will again lead to misuse and abuse of the remedy and eventually a 
nuisance for judicial officers and the applicants. 
If an applicant wants to exit a business or claim damages from a company, they will eventually 
be a part of there are other legal avenues such as contract, delict and other remedial actions that 
may be instituted other than the expansion of one remedy to encompass all. 
 
4.2. The Inclusion of the Appraisal Remedy 
This type of remedy is an extremely new addition to our law. It is a facet of law that has been 
adapted by legal system from far more advanced countries, thus its inclusion has brought 
differing opinions. In my opinion, this is a big leap of faith in our judicial system. Successful 
application will depend on experience and judicial discretion. Proper application will depend on 
research over foreign legal systems that have long-standing experience when adjudicating 
matters using the Appraisal remedy. 
The writer concurs with legal scholars
333
 who are of the view that the inclusion of such a remedy, 
even though noteworthy, is risky and its overall use may vary depending on the economic 
environment in which it is sought and the availability to disgruntled shareholders. This type of 
remedial action would work well in advanced financial environments whereby there is no fear on 
the part of companies when this type of remedy is sought. The Appraisal remedy has one main 
aim and that is to determine the fair value of the shares to be bought.
334
 Foreign jurisprudence 
have not given a precise definition as to what can be regarded as ‗fair value‘ but rather courts use 
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a host of methods and valuation techniques introduced either by legal counsels or legal 
scholars.
335
 Thus, following this way of drafting legislature, under domestic law, have not given 
direction as to what can be determined as fair value, but rather allows the court power to appoint 
appraisers for assistance.
336
 
Lack of application to court under this section in South Africa leaves very little case 
evaluation
337
. However, the recent Loest v Gendac (Pty) Ltd and another (Loest)
338
 judgment has 
shed some light on the application of the Appraisal right in terms of allowing the applicants 
access to certain financial records for the proper determination of the share value and successful 
execution of the Appraisal right. 
The writer opines that the court had correctly evaluated whether or not s164 allows an applicant 
access to financial records, prior to making a court application, for the determination of ‗fair 
value‘. The court by indicating that the applicant did not lose his right as a shareholder by mere 
election to engage in the protection afforded under the section
339
 showed understanding and 
correct interpretation of s164. The court however had shown relaxation on the requirements, 
prior court intervention, which needed to be complied with for the dissenting shareholder to be a 
valid applicant.
340
 Even though the court‘s reasoning was founded on the fact that it was not 
required, it is still an important aspect that needs to be complied with for the s164 dissenting 
shareholder to be a valid applicant. The court further pointed out that the requirements found 
under s164 is ‗…cumbersome‘,341 however it did not lose sight of the fact that the applicant tried 
to engage action against the respondents as a ‗…pre-action discovery‘.342 
The above case demonstrates the courts unwillingness to allow misuse of the Appraisal remedy. 
This is a clear indication of the strict and narrow approach the court will take when determining 
what is allowed and disallowed under the section.  
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The lack of judicial application, in essence, indicates that courts will have to consult foreign 
judgments in order to hone application skills and knowledge on how such a determination is to 
be made and the methods that can and should be used in order to arrive at a fair and just value. 
Under Canadian Jurisprudence Cyprus Anvil Mining Corp. v. Dickson (Cyprus) 343 is the leading case 
when determining fair value. The court points out the following on the aspect of fair value: 
‗… the problem of finding fair value of stock is a special problem in every particular instance. It 
defies being reduced to a set of rules for selecting a method of valuation, or a formula or equation 
which will produce an answer with the illusion of mathematical certainty. Each case must be 
examined on its own facts, and each presents its own difficulties. Factors which may be critically 
important in one case may be meaningless in another. Calculations which may be accurate guides 
for one stock may be entirely flawed when applied to another stock. The one true rule is to 
consider all the evidence that might be helpful, and to consider the particular factors in the 
particular case, and to exercise the best judgment that can be brought to bear on all the evidence 
and all the factors. I emphasize: it is a question of judgment. No apology need be offered for that. 
Parliament has decreed that fair value be determined by the courts and not by some formula that 
can be stated in the legislation…In summary, it is my opinion that no method of determining 
value which might provide guidance should be rejected. Each formula that might prove useful 
should be worked out, using evidence, mathematics, assessment, judgment or whatever is 
required. But when all that has been done, the judge is still left only with a mixture of raw 
material and processed material on which he must exercise his judgment to determine fair 
value…‘344 
The writer submits that the main problem besides lack of experience on the part of the judiciary, 
is the Rand value when compared to other countries. South Africa has many foreign investors 
who, at any time, may pull out from their investments based on our social and political standings. 
This would not only set South Africa back economically, but also has a huge impact on the 
common man who already finds himself living beyond his means. The success of this remedy or, 
rather, the use of this remedy may not be a first choice, if ever, when companies are dealing with 
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shareholders, thus placing pressure on the controlling parties to maintain good relationships 
between all shareholders, which can be seen as a positive. 
The main idea legislative sought to encapsulate when drafting the New Act is the need for 
sufficient and adequate protection for shareholders. However, there are gaps and uncertainty 
when dealing with the Appraisal remedy and this will only be rectified in time or end up making 
the remedy redundant. The Oppression remedy however, shows promise and sends faith to 
existing shareholders in our legal system and the way that it intends on developing however, 
judicial officers need to be mindful when interpreting its scope of application to avoid the 
remedy being misused and abused. 
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